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Sacrifice in the Public Square
CICERONIAN RHETORIC IN MORE'S UTOPIA
AND THE ULTIMATE ENDS OF COUNSEL
A.G. Harmon
Abstract. The different rhetorical strategies of the characters in Thomas More's Utopia revealpar-
allels with Cicero's rhetoric and philosophy. Those parallels resonate with the modern discourse of
"counsel, " andprovide a context through which the nature of the counselor's dilemma-a tension
between what should be done and what can be done-is analyed.
In his work on ideology and utopia, Paul Ricouer speaks of the ideal fantasy
world-the "utopia" that exists "nowhere"-as the means by which we
rethink nature, life, society, and government. The utopia allows us to evaluate
the status quo to decide what is lacking and what is not; in this role, it is valu-
able.' However, when utopia remains at a purely platonic stage, floating so far
from the material world that it is of no practical import, it is worse than useless.
It traps its champions into perpetually criticizing what does exist in the name
of dreams that do not.
While Ricouer's work goes on to explain the intricacies and dynamics of
the association, or dissociation, between ideology and utopia, another line
of inquiry based on his ideas revolves around utopians themselves; for theirs is
a role that has had a place throughout history and manifests itself in strange
shapes in modern times. The nineteenth century witnessed true idealistic
communities-from Brook Farm to New Harmony-and the twentieth cen-
tury saw everything from collective farmers to bunker militants. But a more
common, if more pedestrian, example is the advisor, the counselor, the "true
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believer" in a particular cause, who understands and articulates both the ide-
ology and its utopian materialization.
In our own era, somber-faced men and women, legally trained to the teeth,
appear on Sunday morning news shows in the roles of all-around sages. To a
flurry of questions from journalists, they retort with a flurry of answers, pat
and set. They must do their jobs right, after all, and when it is time for the pub-
lic dissemination of positions, the time for reflection upon them has passed.
The role of governor's counselor is exchanged for governor's proxy.
Rather, it is during that prior meeting between counselors and governors
that policy is truly built. For however long the session lasts, hours or minutes,
the counselors have their forum. They can tell their governors what they must
know or should consider. Whether that advice is objective and aimed toward
the common good, or sycophantic and aimed toward the counselors' personal
advancement, the public has its own ideas. The general consensus is that coun-
selors with a powerful clientele have two options: they can lie or they can
equivocate. They may be trapped within an "interpretive community," as Stan-
ley Fish would have it, unable to effectuate any counsel outside the parameters
of what their audience will hear;2 or they may be consumed by the hegemon-
izing "episteme" of their culture, as Michel Foucault would claim,3 incapable
of articulating any position contrary to the dominant power structure. But in
the end, the general public sizes up the role of counselor with a more general
dismissal: the "Yes Man" is the most familiar of corporate stereotypes.
Of course, this degree of public cynicism is not a modern phenomenon;
indeed, it is at least as old (in the English tradition) as the early sixteenth cen-
tury. In Thomas More's Utopia, the humanist scholar Peter Giles suggests to
world-traveler Raphael Hythlodaeus that a man of wide-ranging talents and
impeccable education should attach himself to a king, and thereby provide
courtly service. Raphael refuses; he has taken care of his family, so that he
need not provide for their advancement, and has disposed of the things that
would tie him to the world. He would rather remain independent. When Giles
says that he meant "'service" to a King, not "'servitude," Raphael's reply is that
of the modern cynic: there is but a syllable between the two words.
4
In this brief exchange, More-lawyer, humanist, and English chancellor-
sets the rhetorical complexion and philosophical tension that characterize a
counselor's public service.5 To be sure, Utopia has other, arguably more
important, ends. It aims its jibes sharply and accurately at a variety of targets:
the injustices of a severe English penal law, the inequities of land enclosures
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throughout Britain, and the perverse attraction to the vanities of an ephemeral
life. Five centuries of readers can be forgiven for adopting the Utopian's
island world as an alternative model by which to live their lives and organize
their cultures (if only dreamily). Critics, too, can be forgiven for their fasci-
nation. Analyzed from countless angles, the work has been ridden hard, worn
out, and retired to a field with other classics, whose weight and meaning are
now more catechized than explored.
But I suggest that More's work does more than offer a commune-in-the-sky
for propagandists of every stripe (Marxists as well as Monastics have found
More an attractive champion), and more than provide a desperate junior high
school teacher with an alternative to Gulliver's Travels for the summer reading
list. It can be those things, which from an artistic standpoint is high praise. But
when analyzed rhetorically, More's Utopia offers an objective sketch of the
rhetorical positions that characterize the modern discourse of counsel: in
the person of Raphael Hythlodaeus, the narrator of the Utopian tale, it pre-
sents the fiery-faced rhetor, who speaks in a bluster of clear lines and incontest-
able choices; his is a rhetoric of clarity without qualification. The tradition of
the scholarly humanist stands behind him, for whom sacrifice in favor of polit-
ical ends proves pointless and to whom the governmental tyrant proves both
unappeasable and poisonous. The type is more prophet than counselor.
Not so much set against Raphael as in distinction from him is the character
of Morus, the civil servant who serves as the cool-headed apologist for diplo-
matic counsel. 7 There is little doubt that Morus stands firmly for his own
humanistic principles, but his is a dialogue of more questions than assertions,
of conciliation rather than division-a rhetoric of accommodation without
compromise. He is more akin to Plutarch's "friendly" counselor: "The friend
is always found on the better side [of a man's nature] trying, after the manner
of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound and to preserve it." 8
The third type, disparaged by both Morus and Raphael, is the alternative
that characterizes the liar/equivocator of the modern stereotype. When law-
yers act as counselors today-whether the client be king or president, minis-
ter, mogul, or common man-the roles by and large still fall somewhere
among these three types of counselors. Largely, it depends on the tension the
lawyer experiences between what is ethical and what is possible, between what
the client should hear and what he does.
In this article, I will first explore the rhetorical dimensions of More's Utopia
and explain the meta-rhetorical aspects that at once reinforce the ethos of the
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two characters and leave both of their respective messages as viable alterna-
tives. Ultimately, the work's model is that of a Ciceronian dialogue, which
presents all views for the readers' consideration without disposing of any. In
this way, it can be distinguished from the more familiar Socratic dialogue, in
which one side is clearly victorious over the other. Whether More made this
rhetorical choice because he himself was ultimately unsure which was better,
or because he wanted to leave the argument open for centuries of readers, is a
matter of irresolvable debate. Rather than consider this issue, I argue that
More's choice of the Ciceronian dialogue is consistent with the work's theme,
and does justice to the complex tensions at play in the role of the counselor. It
does not reduce one side at the expense of the other, which would make the
work into an ideological tract. I will also explain the philosophical and social
positions behind what amounts to Raphael's empirical demonstration of his
case-his relation of the island Utopia-and the philosophy behind Morus'
position.
In the second part of the article, I will analyze the work's two positions on
the counselor's civic duty. Each has its dangers: Raphael insists on acceptance
at the cost of disownment; Morus argues for influence at the peril of indict-
ment. That Utopia lies at the end of one, and the scaffold at the end of the
other, complicates rather than explicates the counselor's choice.
RHETORICAL METHOD
Although centuries apart, both the Roman statesman Cicero and the English
humanist Thomas More considered their troubled times to have arisen from
the same societal ills: profligacy, greed, and a disordered idea of individual
obligation. And for both, these dangers could manifest themselves in a variety
of forms. Cicero considered the republic to be threatened by tyranny, which
might take the shape of despotism, oligarchy, or mob rule. "Hurry back to
Rome," he writes to his friend Atticus, "Come and look at the empty husks of
the real old Roman Republic we used to know. See money distributed before
the elections tribe by tribe, all in one place openly; get the whiff of a dictator-
ship in your nostrils, enjoy the public holiday and the universal free for all." 9
In much the same way, More felt English society to be threatened by dominat-
ing monarchs, sycophantic nobles, and impoverished masses.'" Humanists
such as More viewed themselves as missionaries to a soul-sick world. In
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response to these dangers, both men used persuasive works to level criticisms
at their societies, as well as to suggest proper models for the areas of politics,
education, and religion. And both Cicero and More considered their young
rulers, Octavius Caesar and Henry VIII, respectively, to be the best hope for
a new society, and sought to guide them in making wise choices for the state.
In light of the similarity of their tasks, it is not surprising that parallels exist
between their persuasive works.
More's regard for classical rhetoric is evidenced by a letter he wrote to his
friend, the Dutch humanist Erasmus, concerning the need for a more diligent
study of the subject: "For if we were driven from childhood to follow dili-
gently the authority of Cicero and Fabius ... there would not be, I think, such
a poverty of speech, such deplorable lack of eloquence, such shameful stam-
mering even among those who profess oratorical learning." With impec-
cable school credentials, legal training, and the friendship of the best humanist
writers of his day, More's knowledge of rhetoric was extensive. It is likely his
study included Cicero's De Inventione, the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad
herennium, as well as Quintilian's Institutio Oratorio and the Declammations
then attributed to him. Although large parts of Cicero's De republica were not
discovered until the nineteenth century, More knew the work through reading
Augustine's De Civitas Dei.2 In fact, rhetors such as Quintilian (Fabius) and
Cicero were so popular as classical stylists that a Renaissance fad, "Cicero-
nianism," swept throughout Renaissance Europe. Its devotees tried to scourge
from the literary sphere any who employed vocabulary that the master,
Cicero, had not used himself,13 or any who used images and allusions not of
the classical variety. Mountains had to be compared to "Olympus," cities to
"Athens" or "Troy," heroes to "Hercules," etc. The controversy of the time
regarding Ciceronian imitation eventually culminated in Erasmus' Cicero-
nianus of 1528, in which the author satirized those who apishly imitated the
statesman. Although he admired and consulted Cicero, and advocated him as
a guide for writers, Erasmus publicly foreswore matters of style and form
when they took precedence over substance.'4
If Erasmus' work is used to check Utopia for apish Ciceronianism, More
passes the test. Raphael refrains from classical imagery; he makes no "Rome"
out of Utopia and no "Jove" out of God; the Utopians themselves are "Roman"
in their consummate rationality, but they are open to change, and therefore do
not consider theirs to be the perfect classical society. Instances of Ciceronian-
ism are inserted in jest, as discussed below, not in seriousness. The Utopians
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are also admired for teaching in their own tongue, a neglect of Latin that Cic-
eronians would frown upon, but humanists like More and Erasmus would
condone. In fact, in one of the prefatory letters to the work, the author makes
a preemptive attack on critics of his Utopia: "The barbarian rejects as harsh
whatever is not positively barbarian. The smatterers despise as trite whatever
is not packed with obsolete expressions. Some persons approve only of what is
old; very many admire only their own work."15 The dig at Ciceronian ped-
antry is clear. In the end, Cicero's social and political philosophy informs
Utopia, while his style serves more of a meta-rhetorical purpose.
Also, Erasmus considered a more concise style of writing preferable to
Cicero's. 6 It seems that this is exactly what Raphael offers, or at least what
Morus says he is after when mimicking Raphael's simplicity. 7 Judging by
Erasmus' interest in the work, the author of the Ciceronianus gave at least his
tacit approval to the work. Erasmus stayed with More for a month, during
which time More worked on Book One. He also edited style, added notes, and
penned his prefatory letter of praise. 8 In addition, Erasmus and More were
both scholars interested in satires, especially Lucian satires. The biting wit
Lucian directed at his culture, even religious culture, appealed to men like
More and Erasmus. 9 Both found much in their own worlds worthy of satire-
particularly religious culture. 0 That More was a devotee of Lucian satire per-
haps partly explains why the author used the Ciceronian mode in a work of the
utopian genre. There is a sly gibe at rhetorical pedantry in using the formal
structure in a work of fancy. The fantastic tale itself, likely inspired by the dis-
covery of the new world, allowed More, the highest legal authority in the land
outside the king, to critique existing legal practices and laws.
In other works, More takes to task those who question authority, particu-
larly the authority of the church. Take, for example, his exchange with Chris-
topher St. German. More abominated St. German's Treatise Concerning the
Division Between the Spirituality and The Temporality, which suggested Parlia-
ment set up a great council to control many things, including the clergy. True,
says Richard Marius:
[Utopia] had blazed with the ideal of a united harmonious commonwealth. But
there the secular authority and the religious institutions existed together like
body and soul. Nobody forced the clergy to be good.... But in St. German's
program, the English Parliament was to take hold of the Catholic Church in
England and force it to be good. But who was to make Parliament good? God's
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Spirit inspired the Holy Catholic Church, leading it (as More said repeatedly,
quoting the promise of Christ) into all truth. No wicked priest was ever told by
the church that his wickedness was goodness. But no divine promise granted a
similar infallibility of the moral dictates of the secular government. Kings could
be evil and indeed usually were.2"
One reason they usually were was because they received evil counsel. Beneath
the fantastic tale, Utopia deals with this central problem: how the tale might be
articulated by a counselor, if at all.
Structurally, Utopia falls into three parts. First come the accompanying let-
ters, theparerga2  Although several letters precede the relation of events, only
two are works of fancy, intended as part of the story itself: Mors's letter to fel-
low humanist Peter Giles (hereafter, the Morus/Giles letter), which purports
to accompany the word-for-word account of the two men's meeting with
Raphael Hythlodaeus (the account is being sent for Giles' review); and Giles'
letter to Busleyden (hereafter, the Giles/Busleyden letter), in which Giles
sends the account on to Busleyden, a scholar in the court of Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V.23 After theparerga comes Book One, the account of More
and Giles meeting with Raphael in Antwerp. The three men conduct a dia-
logue about European problems, civic responsibility, and the ideal state.
Finally, in Book Two, Raphael describes what he witnessed in Utopia.
In organizing the work along these lines, More moves the discourse of crit-
icisms and reforms through nearly every rhetorical vehicle: classically-styled
letters, a dialogue, and an oration. Imaginatively, the discussion may begin as
a private exchange between men of goodwill, but the parerga pretend to bring
the dialogues of Books One and Two within the public discourse, the civic
arena of Charles V's court. The ascent to the perfect commonwealth may
seem the stuff of mere musings--conjecture without import-but it must be
read within the frame of the accompanying letters. Conjecture they may be,
but the two books are imagined as resting in the hands of Busleyden, a real
humanist, with real influence over a very real court.24 In this way, the fictive
work creatively enters the realm of ideas, and seeks influence it may have on
the world formed by those who act on ideas.
This was a tenet of the humanist credo, that scholastic enterprise could have
an impact on worldly endeavor. The humanists' duty, says J.H. Hexter, was
"to set forth the ideal standard in all things as an example, a challenge and a
rebuke to the world."25 More's work makes that challenge to the world by
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moving between various modes and levels of reality: a rhetorical exercise, full
of whimsy; a satire, full of bite; and most importantly, a dialectic among differ-
ent theories of counsel, one engaged upon by the author and by the reader.
If it is assumed that the work was to be passed around the humanistic circles
of Europe, as was the custom, then Utopia also becomes a work of humanistic
self-reflection-a cautionary tale, as it were. For the humanists had no small
political influence in the Renaissance. With that influence came attendant dan-
gers and risks. Utopia does not give answers to the difficulties faced by the
counselors of the time, but prompts them to face the difficult questions. A
mind prepared to look at a problem was better prepared to attain its resolution.
Understanding something like the height of Everest-being disabused of
sophistries on what it meant to face it-was a good ways toward achieving
Everest. Although encountering the actual problem might still cause the soul
to blanch, it would not be the first time it had blanched not if the mind had
prepared the soul for the confrontation. And in many ways the humanist's
goal was to prepare the soul to see life's questions for what they were, and to
deal with them honestly.26
This philosophy lay behind the civic humanist's theory of counsel, but it
was not the only one offered by the humanists. The scholastic humanist, as
Gerard Wegemer calls Raphael,27 believed that study revealed truth, and a
truth revealed was one that a reasonable, informed man of courage would
acknowledge and declaim. In this particular manifestation of the scholastic
humanist, Raphael Hythlodaeus, another opinion can be divined: If the world
is not full of reasonable people (i.e., those who will face and acknowledge
truth), then that is the world's problem. The world is to come to the truth, not
the truth to the world.28
Raphael's Theory of Counsel
More establishes Raphael's character in terms of the classical orator, investing
him with ethos,pathos, and logos that the rhetorical masters required.29 Richard
Schoeck points out that in More's Life of John Pics (the great Renaissance
humanist Pico della Mirandola), the author followed the Ciceronian prescrip-
tions for elaborating on a man's character, including details of Pico's parent-
age, early life, and personal attributes." More used a similar technique in his
Letter to Dorp, in which he indirectly outlined the constitution of a humanist
scholar.3"
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Raphael is reported to have a "sun-burnt countenance" like that of a sea
captain, and is compared to Ulysses and Plato. A native of Portugal, Raphael
shows great temerity in traveling around the world with Amerigo Vespucci,
asking leave from his lord in order to explore exotic lands. Raphael is judged
to be a fine scholar, more learned in Greek than in Latin, as he found only
Cicero and Seneca to be of value in the latter. Not only is this a bow to the
humanists, it is also a meta-rhetorical reference: Ciceronian style was the alter-
native to the Senecan. Raphael has studied both masters, and the manner he
uses-the unadorned Senecan-says something about the choice he has
made. 2
More also uses the Giles/Busleyden letter to praise Raphael's forthright
delivery, drawing the orator's mantle close around the traveler. Raphael is
possessed of a world-knowledge "superior to Ulysses," and has no equal in
"the last eight hundred years."33 Being an eyewitness to the Utopian world
also contributes to Raphael's emerging ethos. He is not a man who relates the
tales of others; rather, he offers evidence of his own experience and is ready to
be judged on it. He does not excuse challenges to his credibility by asserting
that they are actually a third-person account.
More writes that no particular art or labor went into the book, as it follows
the simple, unadorned style of Raphael's speech: "Therefore the nearer my
style came to his careless simplicity the closer it would be to the truth, for
which alone I am bound to care."34 Morus and Giles report Raphael to have a
forthright and convincing effect on them, which testifies to his pathos. He is
also radically committed to his position. On the evils of private property, the
excesses of the aristocracy, the inequities of the law, and the duplicities of pub-
lic service, Raphael brooks no quarter.35
More uses the "Cardinal Morton dialogue" to expand upon this radical
quality of Raphael's humanism and the power he brings to it by way of his ora-
tory. Raphael explains that Morton, a humanist in whose home More served as
a boy, once invited Raphael to dinner at his home. There the voyager recounts
his many experiences to a less than friendly crowd. Pitted against a room full
of profligates including lawyers, counselors, and prelates-Raphael defends
his positions on the ideal state, answering objections before they can be raised.
With regard to capital punishment, he draws upon examples of the Polylerite
society's equitable treatment of criminals, as opposed to the barbaric English
practice of executing even those who steal out of desperation.3" As to the size
of the manageable kingdom, and to temperance in the face of power, he offers
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the example of the Achorian society, whose King was obliged to surrender a
conquered territory to another ruler because it would be too costly to main-
tain.37 In the use of societal analogues, Raphael employed the same mode of
persuasion as Cicero in his Republic, where the statesman analogizes the soci-
eties of Rome and Athens. 8
At the close of Raphael's dinner speech, a duly impressed, but nevertheless
boldly assertive, lawyer promises to devastate Raphael's argument. He will
use classical oratory in his refutation: "First, I shall repeat, in order, what you
have said; then I shall show in what respects ignorance of our conditions has
deceived you; finally I shall demolish and destroy all your arguments. So, to
begin with what I promised first." 39 Raphael sizes up the lawyer as typical of
those disputants who are "more careful to repeat what has been said than to
answer it."40 Repetition here is the forerunner to a modern rhetorical tactic,
avoiding a substantive reply by focusing on the question itself its illegiti-
macy, its poorly-framed nature, etc. Memoria cannot, or should not, replace
res. But before the lawyer can start, the Cardinal preempts his disquisition,
noting that such a long prologue does not signal brevity.4' The Cardinal is
aware that oratory can be either enlightening and pleasurable, when exercised
by an orator such as Raphael, or deadly and tedious when not. The power of a
man's ethos is not lost on the Cardinal, and it is reciprocated in Raphael's
appreciation of the prelate's position: "When the Cardinal had finished speak-
ing, they all vied in praising what they all had received with contempt when
suggested by me."42 The cardinal's office adds to the dignity of the speech.
Morton obliquely rewards Raphael's independent stand against the common
opinion represented by those in the room.
Although Raphael's positions are indeed radical for the times, they are not
utterly uncompromising. Reminiscent of Cicero's opinion that public admin-
istrators should care for the welfare of the whole body politic, and not serve
their own selfish interests,43 Raphael suggests special legislation to control
overweening monarchs, monopolies, and land waste. It is true that he enthu-
siastically supports the communal aspect of Utopian life, but in this instance
acknowledges a modified version of the commonwealth that may be more
appropriate for England. And as one aspect of Ciceronianism in Renaissance
England was a slavish dedication to Ciceronian ideas as well as style, Raphael
is in many respects uncharacteristic of Cicero. This is especially true in areas
of social and political thought, discussed below.
By ending the Book One dialogue with the standard objections to egalitarian,
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communal living (i.e., idleness resulting from disincentives to work, mayhem
resulting from no authority) More provides Raphael with a staging ground to
meet all objections in Book Two. In effect, Raphael is to explain the nature of
the ideal state. He meets the challenge with a rhetorical demonstration, Uto-
pian Society, and a refutation of alternatives, British society of the day."
Raphael blends eloquence with narrative drive to assert his demonstration.
For after a general discussion of current problems in England, including the
dissolute landed gentry, the disproportionate nature of capital punishment,
and the evils of private property, he praises the perfect state of the Utopians
and promises to describe it for his eager listeners. In essence, Book One treats
and dismisses all other alternatives before introducing the only real solution in
Book Two45 by means of an exhortium. Although Book Two is often described
as a discourse, or even a monologue, Edward Surtz says that Book Two is
actually a one-sided dialogue. Raphael's "answers to supposed objections, the
antagonism of the invisible rich, the imperatives and exclamations, the con-
sciousness of an audience," all establish the environment of an exchange.46
This one-sided dialogue is proper, since the commonwealth is not being
described in the abstract, but in the particular. Other than rhetorical questions,
which would turn the debate into catechism,4 the others could add nothing to
Raphael's eyewitness account.
Since Book Two was written before Book One, 8 it seems the author tai-
lored the questions of Book One to fit the answers he had already given in
Book Two.49 If that is the case, then the orator created in the first part, and
allowed to take his forum in the second, was actually created backward: the
man fashioned from the oratory. Perhaps this explains Raphael's dominating
presence, even when the Utopian narrative is in full flower. As eccentric,
visionary, and radical, he rails against evils in a manner that would be impres-
sive to a sixteenth century audience skilled in rhetoric.50 And by establishing
the powerful voice and logos first, More was able to reason back to the ethos
behind it. The characters of More and Giles-and five centuries of interested
readers-are testament to the emotional impact, pathos, of the work.
But Raphael is as severe in his method as he is direct in his style. As Gerard
Wegemer points out, whatever rhetorical devices Raphael uses, they are blunt,
even ad hominem: "Raphael begins his response by categorically and univer-
sally denying that any philosopher-advisor could do any good without even-
tually 'sharing the madness of others' in his attempt 'to cure their lunacy. "Sl
In Raphael can be seen the forerunner of the uncompromising idealist, the
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pioneer who will settle for nothing less than the realization of perfection. He
offers proof, after all, not theory. He has seen in Utopia that ideas can take con-
crete form, and that man is capable of more than pious aspiration. His face still
shining from Mt. Sinai, he will not settle for adulterated versions of reality.
Indeed, his gaze is always half turned back in that direction. This is as true in
his ideas as it is in his rhetoric. When speaking of those consummate rhetori-
cians, lawyers who "cleverly manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal
points," Raphael approves of their absolute banishment: "Thus there is less
ambiguity and the truth is more easily elicited when a man, uncoached in
deception by a lawyer, conducts his own case and the judge skillfully weighs
each statement and helps untortured minds to defeat the false accusation of the
crafty."52 The Utopians have few laws; therefore, every man can be an expert
in them. In addition, the most obvious interpretation of the law is that which is
considered the most fair. The Utopians, it seems, are in favor of "plain-
meaning" statutes.
This is revelatory. The Utopians, according to Raphael, have an insight
into the truth and are more accepting of that truth without a need for rhetoric.
What is simple in itself, the law, can be simply perceived. There is no need for
interpretation, no need for legal "spin." What accounts for their receptivity is
not fully explained, but it raises another question. In a civilization less inclined
to simplicity, does not rhetoric have its place? In a world in which laws address
complicated situations, is their interpretation not necessary? If it is granted
that Raphael and Morus agree on what the truth is (for Renaissance human-
ists: the honorable Christian society) their difference lies in the view of rheto-
ric. Raphael will not concede the necessity of rhetoric as a means of mediation.
For him, mediation is not only indirect, but it is also dangerous. It can confuse
the mediator of his role, make him split hairs, convince him that in his quest for
the median, the median is all that should be sought. It would seem that
Raphael's caution to such mediating rhetoric would be "half a good is not better
than all of a good." For Raphael, it is Morus, Giles, and their kind who are con-
stantly in danger of corruption. Such a counsel of "mediation" quite readily
becomes deviation, equivocation, and ultimately prevarication. There is no
room for shadows, and diplomacy in counsel is one vast forest floor. On the
other hand, as Wegemer says, "Rhetoric leads people to accept law, and thus
makes government possible"; 3 this view is in line with that of Morus.
In a way, Raphael is actually anti-rhetorical.54 His argument denies a need
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the power to cast substance in an attractive way and thereby move the audi-
ence toward acceptance of whatever truth that substance stands for. The
difference between them is a matter of which is the best style: simplicity or
adornment. The belief at the very heart of rhetoric is that in some way the
intended audience stands in either opposition to, or is apathetic about, what is
being championed, and that the audience can be won over by the art of speech.
Of course, rhetoric can be aimed at a friendly audience: the preacher's prover-
bial "choir." But even in that case, the audience stands at a level of fervor
below that which the rhetor would have. He must win them to a deeper con-
viction, a higher zeal, than they presently enjoy, and his obstacle in accom-
plishing this is not diminished by the willingness of the audience to be moved.
Political conventions testify to the fact that a crowd, however devoted to
the speaker, can fail to be moved by his rhetoric. The Utopians' pseudo-
conversion to Christianity, based on demonstration, meets with approval
because it is so rational and complete. It does not need the rhetoric of music,
art, or homily that missionaries employed-with mixed success-in the world
that More knew.
For Cicero, speech is the very thing that unifies men:
[W]e must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and
society that Nature has established among men. The first principle is that which
is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human
race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes
of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing and reasoning associate
men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity.55
But Raphael believes more in the power of example than that of rhetoric. He
will relate his tale, and his tale will convince any reasonable man, pure and
simple. If he is persuasive, it is not directly because of his persuasiveness, but
because he has demonstrated his argument by way of his first-hand account of
Utopia. Raphael is the empiricist who will devastate with his demonstration,
or the logician who will triumph with his syllogism. But although Raphael is
in this way anti-rhetorical in philosophy-or at least a-rhetorical More, in a
move that throws a red herring to his readers, draws Raphael, not Morus and
Giles, as the classical rhetor.
The demonstration that Raphael offers, his relation of the Utopian way,
reveals a world that is itself parallel to Cicero's political and social thought. In
particular sections, highlighted here, the discussion revolves around the
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philosophical concepts of justice, honesty, and accountability-all central
concerns for the counselor. Scholarly opinion holds that though More uses
Plato's Republic as a paradigm for his work, he goes to Cicero and Seneca for
his philosophy.6 Utopia draws heavily from Cicero's De Officiis and De Fini-
bus for its ideas. Because Raphael heartily advocates the Utopian way of life,
its policies and beliefs can be attributed to him fairly.
Much of Utopia, including its idea of the state, is organized around a few
basic Ciceronian concepts--honestum, utile, and decorum. In fact, a brief
sketch of Cicero's "'ethical man" can help explain the Utopian view of the
same. Evidently relying on Aristotle's discussion of comparative goods in the
Rhetorica, Cicero sets out three types of "good" which man should seek: i)
that which is intrinsically good (honestum), such as virtue, knowledge, and
truth;57 2) that which is productive of good (utile), such as money; and 3) that
which is preservative of good, such as friendship and honor (De Inventione).58
An individual disposed toward these goods will be well-tempered, properly
balanced, etc. (decorum).59 A society consisting of such individuals will itself
be ordered. It will not only preserve morality, but will also produce order.
Hexter suggests that Utopian social and political institutions are the cause of
their civic virtue, not the other way around." Adopting the proper models can
produce, if not "unfallen people," at least rational, and therefore "better,"
people.
For Cicero, the decorous and the moral are nearly synonymous. He states
that: "[W]hat is proper morally is morally right, and what is morally right is
proper . . whatever is just is decorous.""1 For Cicero, to live according to
nature means to live a virtuous life. The natural should be selected only if it
does not conflict with virtue."2
This sentiment is echoed in the philosophy of the Utopians, who define vir-
tue as living according to nature, since to this end did God create man.63 The
Utopians' philosophical inquiries include an investigation "of the good: of
the soul, of the body and of the external gifts."' 4 They also discuss virtue and
pleasure (the subject of De Finibus), and happiness. For the Utopians, the
highest good is happiness, which is generally defined as pleasure. Although
this Epicurean strain is at first unsettling to Raphael, it is blended with a Sto-
icism that considers only the good to be pleasurable. 5
Cicero says that "a wise man rejects pleasures to secure other greater plea-
sures, and endures pains to avoid worse pains."" No matter the cost, the good
should never be sacrificed in favor of the expedient. 7 Similarly, the Utopians
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hold that a lesser pleasure should never interfere with a greater, and that no
pleasure that brings pain should be pursued." Guided by these principles,
Utopia maintains its decorum by seeking honestum and utile by various means.
What might be considered the basis for Raphael's theory of counsel can be
seen in the concepts of truth and honesty that he relates. Utopian imperatives,
and the way the islanders understand them, are similar to Cicero's thought.
The obligation to keep one's word is a positive duty to the Roman, though he
doubts whether any in the decadent Rome of his day would understand it: "I
see that men do not normally consider it (deceit) immoral and that neither the
law nor civil statutes forbid it; and yet the law of nature forbids it." 69 In empha-
sizing the strictness of truth, Cicero cites the example of the soldier, Regulus.
Captured by the enemy, he was sent back to Rome to negotiate the release of
enemy hostages. Regulus journeyed home, advised the Romans not to release
the hostages, then fulfilled a promise to return to his enemies.7" "Nowadays,"
says Cicero, "it seems amazing that Regulus would go back, but in those
days... oaths were strong."71 The Rome of Cicero's day fairs poorly com-
pared to times past.
Likewise, Raphael's relation of the Utopian appreciation for truth and hon-
esty contrasts with the Europe of More's day. Of course, Raphael's idea of
counsel stops at an appreciation and relation of honest thought; it does not
include applying a rhetorical cast to that thought, or delaying its relation until
the audience can best consume it. To the islanders, the concepts of truth and
honesty are so integrated into Utopian communal life that there is no incentive
for a person to be false. As each person is provided with the same home, cloth-
ing, food, and opportunities, social injustice is practically non-existent. And
they deal with foreigners in the same aboveboard way, always keeping their
truces and indemnities.7" However, due to the rest of the world's characteristic
perfidy, they do not bother themselves with treaties.73 In fact, justice is so much
a part of Utopian life that it can best be defined in terms of offenses against it:
traveling without a permit,74 committing adultery,75 inciting riot in the name of
religious oppression,7' and remaining unrepentant.77 Criminals of a lower
stripe (i.e., those citizens who commit heinous crimes) are committed to sla-
very, the lot of prisoners of war and ascetics. The only capital offenses are
those that are destructive of the state and, by extension, of all the goods that
the state enables. These offenses include conspiracy,
7" criminal recalcitrance, 7'
and espionage."0
In De Officizs, Cicero states that trust is basic to justice, for without it there
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can be no stability in promises and agreements.8' Justice is owed to everyone,
even inferiors and slaves.82 In practice, the first function of justice is to see that
no man shall harm another unless he has been wounded by wrongdoing. The
second function is to see that each man uses public property for public benefit,
and private property for himself.83 Cicero states, "we should take care also that
the punishment should not be out of proportion to the offense, and that some
should not be chastised for a fault for which others are not even called to
account."84 Again, there is an implicit concept of appropriateness.85
Moving to Cicero's political thought and its influence on Utopia, the same
organizing concept of decorum is apparent. Cicero discusses three forms of
government in his Republic, but decides that a mixed constitution best meets
the demands of society. For Cicero, society forms as a result of a bond of
nature. Reason and speech are the unifying principles among men, contribut-
ing to the formulation of the public persona.8" And while he rests much of his
thought on proportionate equality, he says, "If Nature ordains that one shall
desire to promote the interests of a fellow man, whoever he may be, just
because he is a fellow man, then it follows, in accordance with that same
Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common."8 7 The state born
from this society of men exists to provide for the common interests of virtue,
preservation, and security.88 It preserves and produces the goods that its
people seek. However, any state must be governed by some form of delibera-
tive body, consisting of the one (monarchy), the few (aristocracy), or the
many (democracy). Each of these governmental forms is prone to a type of
distortion: tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule.8
As far as kings are concerned, Cicero says that only men of high moral
character should be made sovereigns, so that the people might enjoy greater
justice." In Surtz's opinion, the morality of kings is one of the tacit subjects of
Utopia. The work's catalogue of natural virtues, based roughly on those listed
in Cicero's De Officiis, is a commonplace among humanistic themes." As a
dialogue of counsel meant to instruct a new ruler, Utopia would have informed
the young Henry VIII by supplying a positive example of good rule. 2 Notably,
Utopia's good kings are all fictional, a point that would not have been lost on
its readers.
Most significantly, Raphael calls for the restoration of hoarded land: "The
rich leave no ground to be tilled; they enclose every bit of land for pasture;
they pull down houses and destroy towns, leaving only the church to pen the
sheep in. And as if enough of your land were not wasted on ranges and
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preserves of game, those good fellows turn all human habitations and all cul-
tivated land into a wilderness."93 As in the area of man's intrinsic equality,
Raphael parts company with Cicero on the issue of private property. Private
property is a benefit owed to the aristocrat, in Cicero's opinion, and the obser-
vance and protection of private property is one of the chief functions of the
state. 4 He concedes that in nature, no property is private; but, by long use,
conquest of war, or stipulation, property eventually becomes privatized."
Indeed, Cicero states that one reason men seek out communities is to protect
their private property. He considers criminal the tribune Phillipus' equal dis-
tribution of property" and praiseworthy Aratus of Sicyon's restoration of
confiscated lands. 7 In fact, any type of leveling process, such as cancellation
of debt, is wrong to Cicero. It is unjust toward those whose intelligence or
valor entitles them to their claims.
98
Of course, Utopian society is founded on nothing so much as the idea of
community property. Everything in Utopia, from houses to chamber pots, is
publicly owned, a fact suggested as the fundamental reason for their bliss.
Prior to his Book Two narration, Raphael states that "the one and only road to
the general welfare lies in the maintenance of equality in all respects. When
every man aims at absolute ownership of all the property he can get, even if
there is ever so great abundance of goods, it is all shared by a handful who
leave the rest in poverty."' Although the character Morus defends private
property, Hexter says the author More's "whole life and Christian character
are a living repudiation" to the defense of private property he places in his
own mouth: "without exchange of money there would be an overthrow of all
nobility, magnificence, splendor and majesty."'00 The joke carries More's
characteristic irony, as well as his veiled seriousness.
To the Utopians, anything less than community property would lend itself
to Cicero's oligarchy. To Cicero, anything less than private property would
lend itself to mob rule. It is the ease with which the third form of govern-
ment--democracy-slips into such chaos that causes Cicero to praise it least
of all. He cites the plight of the Athenians as precedent for the dangers in
democracy.'' Perhaps owing to his opinion that wisdom and virtue are rare,
even in educated men, Cicero was wary of entrusting the state's future to the
masses. 102
Without elaborating on specific divisions of power, Cicero suggests a
mixed constitution as preferable to any of the three basic forms." 3 A mixture
would provide power for the magistrate, authority for the nobles, and liberty
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for the people. Each area has its rights and duties, and together they produce
harmony and balance akin to musical symmetry.0 4 Such a society may contain
inequities, but it seeks to administer its citizens' lives in tune with reason and
thereby with nature." 5 This suggests the Utopians, guided by their quest for
decorum and openness to revelation, could expect their civilization to reach
a level that Cicero's had been denied and that Renaissance Europe's had
neglected to achieve.
The "sometimes Ciceronian" basis of Utopian society establishes the exam-
ple by which Raphael intends to convince. His entire disquisition is the
offering of his proof. In unadorned fashion, it is laid before the readers-be
they sovereigns or servants, rulers or counselors-to accept or reject. Ironi-
cally, Raphael appreciates Ciceronian decorum when it is objectively realized,
as in the balanced society of Utopia, but not as a rhetorical tool, as a balanced
means of persuasion. It is Morus who is decorous both in championing rheto-
ric and in appreciating a decorous Utopia.
Morus' Theory of Counsel
The much smaller character of Morus is the alternative to Raphael's dynamic
personality. Morus' rhetoric is not as simple as Raphael's, and considering his
stance against Ciceronianism, More indulges in self-humor by putting Asiatic
periphrasis in his own mouth. He describes Raphael as a "Ulysses" or a
"Plato" and having a pedant's punctiliousness. For example, in the Morus/
Giles letter, the author asks for confirmation of only one fact: the length of a
particular bridge over the Utopian river, Anydrus.'0 6 But these touches,
together with Morus' statement that he had "rather be honest than wise,"
establishes an exactness that confirms both the account and Morus' trustwor-
thiness as a reporter."7 Wegemer points out the lengths More takes to draw
Morus as a civic humanist. In the Morus/Giles letter, the character prays
excuse for his tardiness in completing the work, as affairs of state, family, and
friends have kept him from his studies.'
Morus' character seems altogether more humble than Raphael's, but in the
conventional way of the humanist writer. For example, in the Morus/Giles
letter, the author expresses shame at having sent Giles the "little book"0 9 and
expresses doubts as to publishing the piece at all." In the Giles/Busleyden
letter, the author expands upon the quasi-oratorical nature of the account.
Giles' catalog of praises for Morus' telling is in fact a catalog of steps in rhetor-
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ical composition: "I am at a loss for what I should praise first or most: the faith-
fulness of a most happy memory which could repeat almost word for word...
the sagacity with which he has noted the sources of evils.., and blessings; the
force and fluency of his discourse by which in pure Latin style and forceful
expression he has united numerous topics....' Morus is a faithful rhetorician:
the man who goes to reason and order rather than ornamentation and bom-
bast. In Book One, Morus' ethos as an objective storyteller is eclipsed by
Raphael's. In fact, Morus' gradual evanescence as a character works to More's
advantage as an author. Rather than assume a major role, Morus provides an
objective, discerning imagination upon which Raphael's tale may be regis-
tered. The effect, says Surtz, keeps the fantastic tale within the realm of an
'.ostensibly human world" and provides an immediacy and realism born of
"the contact of one man's experience on another man's consciousness." "12
Some of Morus' assertions also resonate with Cicero's political and social
thought. With regard to personal talents, Cicero recognizes that each man has
a private persona that should be used for the benefit of self and state." 3 This
position is at the foundation of his belief in civic duty, thepersona in service to
the civitas, and also underlies Morus' theory of counsel. Similarly, the Utopi-
ans require all people, including leaders, to work at their crafts for an allotted
time each day. However, unequal gifts signal one thing to Cicero, while they
signal another to the Utopians. For the Roman, the man with greater gifts is
deserving of greater societal benefits. The superior in spirit should rule the
weaker in spirit, and the weak should obey the strong."4 Anything less would
be both unjust and contrary to nature, which has allotted the gifts. This natu-
ral difference in men affects the protocol of duties owed to a particular individ-
ual; the greater the man, the greater the duty owed him.l"5
It is in this area of equality, as in that of private property, where Utopia
diverges from Cicero in philosophy. Although the Utopians elect their leaders
and honor their moral heroes, positions and honors are open to everyone's
achievement. Holiness is revered and knowledge aspired to, but both are
within the realm of each person's sphere of attainment. The Utopians have
their hierarchies in government and value them as beneficial to their society.
But their hierarchies are ones of election, not inheritance, a position that
Cicero would not support. 16
According to Wegemer, when answering Raphael's objections to counsel
of any stripe, Morus adopts a tone in his argument that "reflects the ethos of
his character: polite-civilis-conversation .... Morus uses plain sentence
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structure and diction, and significantly, he mitigates the possibility of the per-
sonal offense often engendered by such strong disagreement through the use
of the parable, antanagoge, understatement, and litotes."" 7 And by choosing
these rhetorical means, the different approaches to counsel are more clearly
delineated. Raphael's plainspokenness, his "anti-rhetoric," insists less on
counseling his audience with the facts than on confronting his audience about
them. Morus, on the other hand, even in the way he deals with opposing
Raphael, clothes his reasons with the figures of accommodation. That More is
aware of the meta-rhetorical side of his work is evident in Morus' assertion:
[The statesman's proper philosophy] knows its stage, adapts itself of the play in
hand, and performs its role neatly and appropriately. Otherwise we have the sit-
uation in which a comedy of Plautus being performed and the household slaves
are making trivial jokes at one another and then you come on the stage in a phi-
losopher's attire and recite the passage from the Octavia where Seneca is disput-
ing Nero. Would I not have been preferable to take a part without words than by
reciting something inappropriate to make a hodgepodge of comedy and trag-
edy? You would have spoiled and upset the actual play by bringing in irrelevant
matter-even if your contribution would have been superior in itself. What-
ever play is being performed, perform it as best you can, and do not upset it all
simply because you think of another which has more interest."'
So it is in the commonwealth. So it is in the deliberations of monarchs. It is bet-
ter, More says, to take part in the play that is being acted, even a comedy,
rather than introduce comedy into a tragedy. Again, notably, Morus refers to
a Senecan tragedy; the parallels between Senecan style and Raphael's own
have been mentioned, and here Morus says it would be indecorous to intro-
duce Seneca. In this passage, More plays upon the many dimensions through
which readers pass in the dialogue---observing the characters' argument as
readers, and yet understanding on some level that they are part of the play, or
dialogue, itself."9
Basically, Morus calls for decorum, a hallmark in Cicero's own philoso-
phy 2' But for Raphael, Morus' decorum amounts to dissemblance at worst,
ineffectiveness at best: "If I would stick to the truth, I must needs speak in the
manner I have described."' 121 In the end, the two characters have two different
approaches to rhetoric and truth, two theories of what counsel can accomplish
and the means by which it can be accomplished. At first, it seems Raphael says
that the truth should be revealed, and its inherent power accepted by the
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unconverted. 122 If they refuse, he will shake the dust from his feet. But Morus'
is the civic humanist's approach. To the unconverted, you cannot play strange
songs or tell strange tales. You must adapt your counsel to the audience. His
..play" metaphor suggests as much. The rhetor/counselor enters the play that
is on stage, takes his role, and converts from within.
Raphael then reveals his true opinion of counsel:
Moreover, there is no chance for you to do any good because you are brought
among colleagues who would easily corrupt even the best of men before being
reformed themselves. By their evil companionship, either you will be seduced
yourself or, keeping your own integrity and innocence, you will be made a
screen for the wickedness and folly of others. Thus you are far from being able
to make anything better by that indirect approach of yours.' 23
The "indirect approach" of Morus' counsel is not realistic or practical, accord-
ing to Raphael; it is pure folly. Mors deludes himself by indulging in a coun-
sel that will either cause the sacrifice of his integrity or its misuse as a front for
chicanery. Raphael shows he has no confidence in governmental counsel
under any form, not even his own unadulterated version. 
24
Rhetorical Classification
As a rhetorical work, Utopia has been classified as a declamatio,25 as a scholas-
tic meditation, 126 and as a suasoria.121 It could just as easily be seen as an epide-
ictic piece, praising one society, the Utopian world, while blaming another, the
English. Following the full story of Utopia, Raphael roundly attacks the mod-
ern world's extravagances and selfishness in a peroration. But although he
may have the most-and last-words, a final verdict on the Utopian society is
never rendered. "I cannot agree with all that he [Raphael] said," states More,
but he goes on to admit that many Utopian features should be emulated by the
Europeans. 28 With the conflict unresolved, the many levels of dialogue that
have taken place-between present and past, Europeans and Utopians, schol-
ars and statesmen, humanists and traditionalists-remain in tension. In this,
More patterns his work on the Ciceronian dialogue-presenting all views
without providing for their absolute disposition-rather than on the Socratic
one. Thus, Utopia is not so much a dialogue of counsel for the ruler, as is often
suggested, as a dialogue of counsel for the counselor himself.
In one sense, judging by the influence it has on Morus and on generations
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of readers, Raphael's example is successful as an empirical demonstration.
Then again, viewed meta-rhetorically, this example is penned by More him-
self, the humanist, who offers the example in the form of the Ciceronian dia-
logue, with a slyness that has belied concrete determination of its meaning for
centuries. As Hexter says, the inquiry of whether to act as counselor is not a
clearly stated problem with a syllogistically-derived solution, but presents the
horns of a dilemma: serve corruptly and advance yourself, or serve earnestly
and endanger yourself.'29 To a postmodern age attracted to many-horned
dilemmas, More's rhetorical choice of the Ciceronian dialogue is most appeal-
ing. However, as a pragmatic man, More had to make his choice; ultimately,
the answer turned on the question of civic duty, and the counselor's role
therein.
CIVIC DUTY
In De Officiis, Cicero says: "There is one class of men that is rarely met with:
it is composed of those.., who have time to consider carefully what career in
life they prefer to follow." 30 Doubtless, Cicero counted himself among those
men.
Though he loved philosophy from an early age, he chose a life of public
service. 3 ' There is a parallel with More's life here, for at the time he was writ-
ing Utopia, More had just been offered the position of counselor to Henry
VIII. Hexter concludes that when More returned to England from The Neth-
erlands in 1515, prior to writing the Book One dialogue, the die had not yet
been cast. He was still weighing the life of humanist scholar against the duties
of a royal counselor.' And Stephen Greenblatt suggests More's struggle was
actually life-long, a tug-of-war between the cloistered and the intellectual life.
This required a compromise position, resolved ultimately on the scaffold.'33 If
this reasoning is indulged, then by choosing the dialogue to conduct the
debate, More selected both a Ciceronian literary mode and a Ciceronian
theme to assess his dilemma.'34
The debate is presaged in the Giles/Busleyden letter, when Giles writes to
the court of Charles V, addressing Busleyden as one who "assists with good
counsels the government of the commonwealth in which you have labored for
many years, winning the highest praise for wisdom and integrity." ' Morus'




Sacrifice In the Public Square
would be invaluable to a king, because "from the monarch flows a stream of all
that is good or evil over the whole nation." Raphael states that he abhors the
idea. Kings love only war. They do not surround themselves with people who
disagree or suggest anything that they do not already intend to do. "[A]mong
royal councilors everyone is actually so wise as to have no need of profiting by
another's counsel, or everyone seems so wise in his own eyes as not to conde-
scend to profit by it, save that they agree with the most absurd saying of, and
play the parasite to, the chief royal favorites whose friendliness they strive to
win by flattery." 3 Counsel amounts to either flattery of others or of the self,
neither an attractive alternative.
Morus next appeals to Raphael's sense of civic responsibility. It is the duty
of every good man to serve the commonweal,"' a refrain often heard in
Cicero. Quoting Plato, Cicero says: "We are not born for ourselves alone; but
our country claims a share of our being."' 38 To cast away natural talents that
could foster a healthy state is immoral. 39
Morus, too, uses Plato in his argument. He remarks that Raphael's favorite
philosopher considered a happy commonwealth to depend on philosophers
becoming kings. "What a distant prospect of happiness there will be if philos-
ophers will not condescend even to impart their counsel to kings," says
Morus. 4" Raphael remains unpersuaded, oddly ignoring that all Utopian life is
some kind of service to the state.
Raphael's position is owing to his belief that a philosopher must remove
himself from public involvement. It is the view of a radical humanist, but one
that More did not dismiss entirely. His friend Erasmus warned John Colet:
"Draw away from worldly affairs, but if you must not, withdraw into spiritu-
ality once the affairs of the world threaten peace of mind.""' With a note of
sadness, Erasmus also wrote to More himself, once the latter had made his
decision: "You will be taking service under an excellent prince, but there is no
doubt that you will be carried away from us and from learning." 4 Behind this
sentiment is a conviction that the educator/philosopher humanist was to serve
the world by educating it, not by serving within its already corrupt institu-
tions. From Raphael's perspective, their position is outside, not inside, the
regime.
Again, Cicero's position is quite clear. As much as he admires scholarly
pursuits, enthusiasm for private study cannot draw one away from public
affairs. Only the weak or unhealthy should choose philosophy over public ser-
vice. He also criticizes those who loathe commands and offices; it is all right to
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consider fame meaningless, but not as a front for those too fearful of the hard
work, criticism, and defeats that public life brings.'43 In a passage that could
have had great significance to More in making his decision, Cicero says that a
statesman requires more greatness of spirit and freedom from annoyances
than a philosopher, who risks nothing: "A man in state must consider not only
the moral correctness of an action, but whether he has the ability to carry it
through-at the same time he should not despair uselessly through cowardice
and not be excessively confident through eagerness. Forethought is essential."'4
For Cicero, public service is more courageous because it is more demanding.
Scholarship, in fact, is best used to assist the common life: "The study and
knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no
practical results to follow." 145 He adds: "And if we consider how many praise-
worthy commonwealths exist now and have existed in the past, and remember
that the establishment of a State which is stab enough to endure for ages
requires by far the highest intellectual powers that nature can produce, what a
multitude of great geniuses there must have been."'4 Statecraft combines phi-
losophy and service. The two are not exclusive; in fact, they are integrated.
In Utopia, there is no notable distinction between the philosopher and the
statesman. Perhaps More illustrates the integration that Cicero supports. But
More's entrance into Henry VIII's court did not simply turn upon convincing
himself that he could indeed have influence, or that scholarship and public ser-
vice were not mutually exclusive. As a Christian humanist, he also had to con-
vince himself that his faith could benefit from his entrance into public life.
Hexter lists two defining characteristics of the Christian Humanist: devotion
to works of both Christian and pagan antiquity, and a belief that those litera-
tures contained something that could better men and resurrect society. When
convinced of this belief, says Hexter, these humanists set themselves off on a
mission of universal salvation.'"I Perhaps More's decision rested on a belief
that whatever virtue he possessed should not be cloistered in Utopian fashion.
Morus' final use of Ciceronian civic humanism in Utopia comes in his
advice to Raphael on the statesman's philosophy. Returning to decorum, he
likens the philosopher to a player who must perform as best he can within the
play that is being performed, and not upset everything simply because another
play is of more interest to him. Like the player, the counselor must not desert
the commonwealth because he cannot "pluck up wrong-headed opinions by
the root" or cure long-standing vices to his heart's desire."' As strange ideas
cannot be forced all at once, the "indirect" approach might be more useful.
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Finally, suggests Morus, "What you cannot turn to good you must at least
make as little bad as you can. For it is impossible that all should be well unless
all men were good."'49 To this suggestion Raphael gives the reply of the radical
humanist. 50 No compromise is possible in matters of truth, implies Raphael.
Indeed, the adaption to circumstances that Morus suggests is the very thing
Erasmus considered to be the root of courtly vice. 5' In light of this, Raphael's
next words ring a particularly ominous note, especially considering that the
man who writes them will mount the scaffold in twenty years' time, for refus-
ing to do precisely what is described: "At court there is no room for dissem-
bling, nor may one shut one's eyes to things. One must openly approve the
worst counsels and subscribe to the most ruinous decrees. He would be
counted a spy and almost a traitor, who gives only faint praise to evil coun-
sels."' 52 By not accepting Henry's Act of Supremacy, More was counted just
that. In one of history's coincidences, or more likely, patterns, Cicero had met
with a similar end some fifteen centuries before. Betrayed by the young
Octavius, his hopes for a Roman republic dashed, the orator was hunted down
on his flight from the city. Decapitated, his head and hands were displayed in
the public forum.
In the Giles/Busleyden letter, Giles states that Raphael's whereabouts have
been variously reported. Some say that he has died; some, that he has returned
to his homeland. Others say that he has gone back to Utopia.'53 If the last is
true, it would seem that Raphael chose the philosopher's retreat that he so
greatly advocated. And in the crowning similarity with Cicero's life, by
choosing the public sphere, More ultimately found himself taking a position
against his ruler; a position decorous in terms of a different, and in his estima-
tion, more permanent society than the one in which he served.
CONCLUSION
To return to Ricouer's ideas on utopia-a place beyond any known territory-
he says it has the power to bring new perspectives on the territory we do know
and live in every day: "What must be emphasized is the benefit of this special
extraterritoriality. From this "no place" an exterior glance is cast on our real-
ity, which suddenly looks strange, nothing more being taken for granted. The
field of the possible is now open beyond that of the actual; it is a field, therefore,
for alternative ways of living." '54
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The same can be said for the counselor, who-his earnestness taken for
granted-must encounter alternative ways of approaching what is often a
losing proposition. Each approach has its own stock of virtues. Raphael's the-
ory of counsel, its anti-rhetorical stance, its plainspokenness, is unyielding in
its quest for virtue and unqualified clarity. In modern criticism, its critics might
call it the discourse of demonization, one that allows its opponent no room for
dialogue and affords him no means of access. But Raphael and his soldiers are
on the side of those that say a grim business demands a frank argument. His-
tory shows what happens when you do not-for good reasons or bad-
declare yourself. And in granting Raphael the lion's share of the dialogue,
with his demonstration at center stage, More exhibits at least tacit admiration.
He himself could be demanding, and no one doubted where he stood in matters
of faith; William Tyndale, More's Protestant foe and polemical opponent,
kept up a heated debate with More over the Church. Tyndale ultimately lost
his own battle at the stake.
But More was also of the opinion that, although you should only go so far,
you should go at least that far. The commonwealth was worth the gamble.
Critics would call this the discourse of acquiescence or complicity. But for its
rhetors, it is the only means to do any good in the world. The only way to gain
an audience is through the play, the poem, the speech the proper naming of
things. In postmodern times, when meaning has been deconstructed and
"naming" itself has received a bad name, both Moms' and Raphael's views of
counsel are more problematic, theoretically speaking. But from a practical
standpoint, Moms' position calls for civic engagement. In the end, a remove
from society will not do. No one can answer questions alone. Questions cannot
even be asked alone, at least not so as to benefit any but the questioner. Raphael,
one may argue, would have found such a sacrifice predictable and ultimately
unnecessary. More found such a sacrifice predictable and ultimately acceptable.
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